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Business Wire 27-Jan-2025 7:00 AM
Aims to Install an Independent Slate and Legendary CEO Committed to Abandoning the Blocked Nippon Deal, Collecting the $565 Million Breakup Fee and Making U.S. Steel Great Again in the Public Market
Believes the Board's Decision to Pursue a Risky Sale to Nippon – an Overseas Bidder Paying Just $1 Per Share More Than the Top Domestic Bidder – Has Led to a Dead End
Contends the Board and CEO David Burritt, Who Collectively Stood to Receive $100+ Million if the Sale Proceeded, Prioritized Deal Advocacy at the Expense of Financial Health and Operational Performance
Expresses Concern About the Board and Mr. Burritt Continuing to Devote Immense Resources to Litigation Despite Legal Headwinds, Labor Resistance and Bipartisan Policymaker Opposition
Slate's Foremost Priority is Pursuing a Public Market Turnaround of U.S. Steel – Not Trying to Solicit Alternative Bids and Sell the Company
Ancora Holdings Group, LLC (collectively with its affiliates, "Ancora" or "we"), a diversified investment firm that oversees approximately $10 billion in assets, today issued the below open letter to the Board of Directors (the "Board") of United States Steel Corporation (NYSE:X) ("U.S. Steel" or the "Company") regarding a variety of issues, including the Company's recently blocked sale to Nippon Steel Corporation ("Nippon").
To receive important updates, visit www.MakeUSSteelGreatAgain.com.
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January 27, 2025
United States Steel Corporation 600 Grant Street Pittsburgh, PA 15219 Attn: The Board
Dear Members of the Board,
Ancora is a growing shareholder of U.S. Steel. As an investment firm with deep roots in the Midwest, we have an affinity for the industrial and logistics companies that collectively form the backbone of America's economy. We are proud to be investors in companies such as Berry Global Group, Inc., Norfolk Southern Corporation, RB Global, Inc. and now U.S. Steel. Owning these types of businesses enables us to pursue strong risk-adjusted returns while helping support American competitiveness, job creation and wage growth.
Although we understand why the Board explored strategic alternatives in 2023, its ultimate decision to ignore national security and pursue a risky sale to Nippon – an overseas bidder that came in just $1 per share higher than a competing domestic bidder – has led to a dead end. There appears to be no legal basis and no precedent for U.S. Steel's costly litigation over the Presidential Executive Order blocking the transaction. Moreover, President Donald Trump is a vocal opponent of the deal and long-term proponent of strengthening America's domestic manufacturing base. He also has long-held skepticism about foreign direct investment from Japan based on his own business dealings dating back to the 1980s. We see no reason to believe that President Trump, a high-conviction businessman who was elected by middle-class and working-class voters, is going to contradict his self-described "America First" agenda and disregard the opposition of the United Steelworkers.
The Board's choice to double down on its extremely poor decision to pursue a sale to Nippon has also kept U.S. Steel in a corroded state. Chief Executive Officer David Burritt, who stood to rake in more than $70 million himself if the sale had been consummated, has been allowed to misallocate capital, issue unreliable and overoptimistic forecasts, and repeatedly miss financial targets. It seems the Board failed to keep Mr. Burritt's attention on efficiency, execution and risk management as steel prices remained depressed over the past year. Rather than finally acknowledge the Company's perilous trajectory and try to course correct, the Board remains steadfastly committed to an underperforming leader who apparently lacks the ability and vision to bring U.S. Steel back from a busted transaction.
In light of these alarming decisions and the unjustifiable deference to Mr. Burritt, who has made clear through outlandish rhetoric that he is self-interested and unfit for leadership, Ancora has nominated nine highly qualified, independent candidates for election to the Board at U.S. Steel's 2025 Annual Meeting of Stockholders. Our slate includes individuals with corporate governance experience, finance expertise, industrials and manufacturing backgrounds, public policy acumen and other qualifications critical to turning around a standalone U.S. Steel. The slate's plan includes installing Alan Kestenbaum, a steel industry legend who delivered total shareholder returns of more than 450% at Stelco Holdings Inc., as a replacement for Mr. Burritt. We expect the investment community will agree that any steel company would be fortunate to have Mr. Kestenbaum assume such a role.
Our slate and Mr. Kestenbaum look forward to ultimately releasing their full plan for enhancing U.S. Steel's corporate governance, cost structure, labor relations, margins, operations and long-term viability as a force within the American economy. With the tailwind of President Trump's agenda, including steel tariffs, our nominees are confident they will shift the Company's strategy from hoping to be saved to implementing a multi-year plan that targets meaningful share price appreciation.
The Case for Wholesale Change: The Board Has Doubled Down on its Bad Decision to Pursue a Risky Sale – Even After the Sale was Blocked by Executive Order
We want to take this opportunity to share a few key facts. First and foremost, no transaction blocked by Presidential Executive Order after a review by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States has ever gone through. This means there is no legal precedent for the litigation brought by U.S. Steel and Nippon earlier this month.
Although U.S. Steel seems to be holding out hope that it can convince President Trump to approve the deal, the facts indicate that this is a pipe dream. President Trump has repeatedly voiced opposition to the transaction and has long been skeptical of deals with Japanese businesses.1 In fact, just last month he stated "I am totally against the once great and powerful U.S. Steel being bought by a foreign company, in this case Nippon Steel of Japan […] As President, I will block this deal from happening."2 Nothing he has said since former President Joseph Biden's Executive Order indicates a change of heart.
In addition to the aforementioned headwinds, the blocked deal also faced opposition from Vice President J.D. Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, a bipartisan contingent of high-profile lawmakers and the United Steelworkers. When they were in the Senate, Messrs. Vance and Rubio previously co-authored a letter to then-Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen to stress that "[t]he transaction was not entered into with U.S. national security in mind."3 It should be clear as day that U.S. Steel is now fighting a binding Executive Order, the Trump administration, an array of senators and representatives, and a multitude of third parties that do not buy into Mr. Burritt's self-serving arguments.
The Board should also be aware of what independent and objective legal experts have to say:
"Unfortunately for Nippon Steel, their argument is not particularly strong. The president's action in this case is explicitly excluded from judicial review under U.S. law."
- Akira Inoue, partner, Baker & McKenzie4
"The D.C. Circuit is unlikely to overturn the blocking order based solely on allegations of pre-determination or the appearance of a sham process. Substantial evidence of constitutional violations or procedural defects is normally required. In addition, there does not appear to be a process for taking evidence, so the sham argument cannot be developed beyond what is in the public record."
- Ken Nunnenkamp, partner, Morgan Lewis5
"Nippon and U.S. Steel face a formidable uphill battle in challenging CFIUS' referral and the president's exercise of authority to block the deal on national security grounds. Congress intended to shield CFIUS' decisions, and the president's conclusions under the CFIUS regime, from virtually all judicial review, an approach that is consistent with broad judicial deference to the executive branch on national security matters."
- Mario Mancuso, George W. Hicks Jr. and Lucille Hague, partners, Kirkland & Ellis6
It borders on delusional to think that the Trump administration would use precious political capital at the start of its term to reverse its public position on the transaction, not to mention undermine its clearly articulated focus on revitalizing American manufacturing and insourcing.
The Case for Wholesale Change: The Board Has Allowed a Conflicted, Underperforming CEO to Hinder U.S. Steel's Credibility and Undermine the Company's Future
Ancora has a proven track record of correctly identifying companies that are held back by conflicted or unfit CEOs. Before we seek the removal of a CEO, we typically try to work with a board of directors to address and course correct the executive's shortcomings. In this case, however, we see no future with Mr. Burritt.
In our view, Mr. Burritt exhibited disqualifying behavior on January 3rd, when he issued a statement that called former President Biden's decision "shameful and corrupt." He continued what appeared to be a tirade by calling highly respected United Steelworkers President David McCall a "union boss," effectively questioning his integrity.7 We also need to scrutinize the Board's oversight of Mr. Burritt in light of his public accusation that the prior administration made a decision that supports the Chinese Communist Party. It runs counter to the interests of shareholders, to which Mr. Burritt owes a fiduciary duty, to make seemingly unhinged and retaliatory statements about plans "to fight President Biden's political corruption."8 Regardless of political leanings, this is not how standard public company executives act. Perhaps this is why Jeh Johnson, former Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, abruptly resigned from the Board in recent weeks.
Since before the sale to Nippon was announced, Mr. Burritt also appears to have diverted his focus from U.S. Steel's operations. For example, on the conference call for the Nippon sale announcement, analysts noted that Big River's EBITDA per ton was down roughly 59% and the mini-mill cost per ton was up roughly 23% following the 2021 Big River acquisition.9 Mr. Burritt's response to this was tone deaf: "we feel absolutely wonderful about this Big River facility. And with Big River 2, it's going to be even more remarkable."10
When U.S. Steel reported fourth quarter and full year 2023 earnings only six weeks later, it revealed $12 million of costs related to Big River, which had the effect of reducing the mini-mill segment's EBITDA to just $74 million.11 Unfortunately for shareholders, the trend of excess costs at Big River has continued unabated. On September 19, 2024, the Company disclosed that the mini-mill segment's adjusted EBITDA would be lower than the previous quarter, impacted by $40 million of costs from the Big River 2 mini-mill.12 The Company followed this with a vague cautionary note on December 19, 2024, stating Big River 2 "ramp-related costs exert pressure on the quarter."13
In addition to unrelenting Big River cost overruns, U.S. Steel has consistently missed earnings estimates over the past year and a half while lagging its peers. Notably, during Mr. Burritt's tenure, the Company's total shareholder returns have underperformed peers by a staggering 227.7%.
Total Shareholder Returns* |
|||
|
1-year |
5-year |
Burritt CEO Tenure |
U.S. Steel |
-7.7% |
-21.3% |
13.5% |
Peer Median |
24.9% |
180.6% |
241.2% |
Relative Performance |
-32.2% |
-201.9% |
-227.7% |
Source: FactSet and Bloomberg. Peers include Commercial Metals Company, Cleveland-Cliffs Inc., Reliance, Inc., Steel Dynamics, Inc. and Nucor Corporation. |
|||
*Total shareholder returns as of market close August 11, 2023, the last trading day prior to the Company's disclosure of initiating a strategic alternatives process. Mr. Burritt's election by the Board to assume the CEO role was announced May 10, 2017. |
Key Performance Metrics** |
||||
|
Revenue Growth |
Adjusted EBITDA Growth |
CapEx Growth |
Free Cash Flow Growth |
U.S. Steel |
19.7% |
-25.6% |
336.6%*** |
-225.7% |
Peer Median |
38.3% |
15.5% |
79.2% |
55.0% |
Relative Performance |
-18.6% |
-41.1% |
257.4% |
-280.7% |
**Key performance metrics measured from figures reported by U.S. Steel and peers from Q2 2021 to Q3 2024. These dates reflect the start of the economic recovery from COVID and the most recently reported quarter. |
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***CapEx Growth is based on incurred expenses and likely does not yet reflect U.S. Steel's $600 million budget expansion for Big River 2. |
U.S. Steel is now in a dire state due its excessive capital spending, high debt, soft earnings and nonexistent contingency plan. While Mr. Burritt may not care due to what seem to be his jet-setting ways, we believe the city of Pittsburgh and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania have been put at economic risk by his sale aspirations and mismanagement of the Company. There are consequences associated with having out-of-touch leadership with weak involvement in local communities. Absent a miracle, Ancora believes a substantial and urgent reconstitution of the Company's leadership is necessary.
An Alternative Path Forward: Our Slate and Mr. Kestenbaum Want to Make U.S. Steel Great Again in the Public Market
Ancora has nominated a fit-for-purpose slate with nine highly qualified individuals, whose complementary skills make them greater than the sum of their parts. Each is a leader in his or her respective field and is able to draw on prior public company experience to help set a viable go-forward strategy. Our nominees include individuals with experience in corporate governance, executive leadership, finance, logistics, manufacturing, regulatory affairs and strategic transactions. They come to the Board free of the incumbents' past mistakes, open-minded, and committed to producing enduring value for shareholders and stakeholders.
Importantly, the slate includes industry heavyweight Alan Kestenbaum, the former Chairman and CEO of Stelco, as a CEO candidate for U.S. Steel. If our slate's campaign is successful, Mr. Kestenbaum will bring to the role a uniquely close relationship with the United Steelworkers, expertise in identifying and operating undervalued assets, and an unrelenting commitment to delivering the best possible results.
Most notably, Mr. Kestenbaum has a history of turning U.S. Steel's failed endeavors into home runs. Look no further than what he accomplished at Stelco, a company U.S. Steel put into bankruptcy. Mr. Kestenbaum acquired Stelco for approximately $53 million, only to later sell it for more than $2 billion.14 In the process, he enriched his shareholders through the success of a turnaround, whereas U.S. Steel's investors received virtually nothing for the asset. Considering the significant underperformance of U.S. Steel's operations and Mr. Burritt's underwhelming results as a leader, Mr. Kestenbaum represents a massive upgrade on all fronts.
If elected, our slate and its CEO candidate are committed to the following:
Please note that despite the sale to Nippon being blocked this month, you – the Board – decided to keep a January deadline for director candidate nominations in an apparent effort to insulate yourselves. We complied with your deadline despite being in the process of amassing a meaningful stake that will be disclosed in due course. Make no mistake, Ancora, as well as Mr. Kestenbaum, intend to build meaningful positions as sale pipe dreams fade and the Company's share price continues resetting from what have been artificially inflated levels.
In closing, our goal here is straightforward: make U.S. Steel great again for the benefit of employees, customers, shareholders and all other stakeholders who want a bright future for this American icon. Only under a new Board and management team do we believe this is possible.
Regards,
Fredrick D. DiSanto Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Ancora Holdings Group, LLC |
James Chadwick President Ancora Alternatives LLC |
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DIRECTOR CANDIDATE BIOS
Jamie Boychuk
Mr. Boychuk is an experienced public company executive with a relevant background in logistics, operations and supply chain management as well as valuable perspectives from his tenure at a major customer of U.S. Steel (Canadian National Railway Company).
Fredrick D. DiSanto
Mr. DiSanto is a shareholder and experienced public company director with expertise in capital allocation, corporate finance, and the debt and equity markets.
Robert P. Fisher, Jr.
Mr. Fisher is a seasoned investment manager, investment banker and public company director with significant experience in dealmaking and the metals and mining sector.
Dr. James K. Hayes
Dr. Hayes is a proven senior executive and board member with experience implementing growth initiatives and a relevant background in manufacturing and strategic planning.
Alan Kestenbaum
Mr. Kestenbaum is a seasoned steel industry leader and board member with significant expertise when it comes to turnarounds, strategy, operations, M&A, and labor and stakeholder relations.
Roger K. Newport
With 35 years of experience in the steel industry, Mr. Newport brings the background of a public company director and former steel company CEO with expertise in strategy, finance, M&A, operations, regulatory matters, and labor and stakeholder relations.
Shelley Y. Simms
Ms. Simms is a regulatory, compliance and public policy expert who has held leadership roles at several Pennsylvania-based corporations and formerly served as a top ethics official for the state.
Peter T. Thomas
Mr. Thomas is a senior executive and public company director with decades of relevant experience and insight in manufacturing from his leadership roles at several public companies across the industrials sector.
David J. Urban
Mr. Urban is a legal, government affairs and stakeholder relations expert with additive experience from his service as an advisor, executive and public company director.
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About Ancora
Founded in 2003, Ancora Holdings Group, LLC offers integrated investment advisory, wealth management, retirement plan services and insurance solutions to individuals and institutions across the United States. The firm is a long-term supporter of union labor and has a history of working with union groups and public pension plans to deliver long-term value. Ancora's comprehensive service offering is complemented by a dedicated team that has the breadth of expertise and operational structure of a global institution, with the responsiveness and flexibility of a boutique firm. For more information about Ancora, please visit https://ancora.net.
CERTAIN INFORMATION CONCERNING THE PARTICIPANTS
Ancora Catalyst Institutional, LP ("Ancora Catalyst Institutional"), together with the other participants named herein, intend to file a preliminary proxy statement and accompanying universal proxy card with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") to be used to solicit votes for the election of Ancora Catalyst Institutional's slate of highly-qualified director nominees at the 2025 annual meeting of stockholders of United States Steel Corporation, a Delaware corporation (the "Company").
ANCORA CATALYST INSTITUTIONAL STRONGLY ADVISES ALL STOCKHOLDERS OF THE COMPANY TO READ THE PROXY STATEMENT AND OTHER PROXY MATERIALS, INCLUDING A PROXY CARD, AS THEY BECOME AVAILABLE BECAUSE THEY WILL CONTAIN IMPORTANT INFORMATION. SUCH PROXY MATERIALS WILL BE AVAILABLE AT NO CHARGE ON THE SEC'S WEB SITE AT HTTP://WWW.SEC.GOV. IN ADDITION, THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS PROXY SOLICITATION WILL PROVIDE COPIES OF THE PROXY STATEMENT WITHOUT CHARGE, WHEN AVAILABLE, UPON REQUEST. REQUESTS FOR COPIES SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO THE PARTICIPANTS' PROXY SOLICITOR.
The participants in the anticipated proxy solicitation are expected to be Ancora Catalyst Institutional, Ancora Bellator Fund, LP ("Ancora Bellator"), Ancora Catalyst, LP ("Ancora Catalyst"), Ancora Merlin Institutional, LP ("Ancora Merlin Institutional"), Ancora Merlin, LP ("Ancora Merlin"), Ancora Alternatives LLC, ("Ancora Alternatives"), Ancora Holdings Inc. ("Ancora Holdings"), Fredrick D. DiSanto, Jamie Boychuk, Robert P. Fisher, Jr., Dr. James K. Hayes, Alan Kestenbaum, Roger K. Newport, Shelley Y. Simms, Peter T. Thomas, and David J. Urban.
As of the date hereof, Ancora Catalyst Institutional directly beneficially owns 121,589 shares of common stock, par value $1.00 per share (the "Common Stock"), of the Company, 100 shares of which are held in record name. As of the date hereof, Ancora Bellator directly beneficially owns 62,384 shares of Common Stock. As of the date hereof, Ancora Catalyst directly beneficially owns 12,831 shares of Common Stock. As of the date hereof, Ancora Merlin Institutional directly beneficially owns 123,075 shares of Common Stock. As of the date hereof, Ancora Merlin directly beneficially owns 11,165 shares of Common Stock. As the investment advisor and general partner to each of Ancora Catalyst Institutional, Ancora Bellator, Ancora Catalyst, Ancora Merlin Institutional, Ancora Merlin and certain separately managed accounts (the "Ancora Alternatives SMAs"), Ancora Alternatives may be deemed to beneficially own the 121,589 shares of Common Stock beneficially owned directly by Ancora Catalyst Institutional, 12,831 shares of Common Stock beneficially owned directly by Ancora Catalyst, 62,384 shares of Common Stock beneficially owned directly by Ancora Bellator, 123,075 shares of Common Stock beneficially owned directly by Ancora Merlin Institutional, 11,165 shares of Common Stock beneficially owned directly by Ancora Merlin and 137,453 shares of Common Stock held in the Ancora Alternatives SMAs. As the sole member of Ancora Alternatives, Ancora Holdings may be deemed to beneficially own the 121,589 shares of Common Stock beneficially owned directly by Ancora Catalyst Institutional, 12,831 shares of Common Stock owned directly by Ancora Catalyst, 62,384 shares of Common Stock beneficially owned directly by Ancora Bellator, 123,075 shares of Common Stock beneficially owned directly by Ancora Merlin Institutional, 11,165 shares of Common Stock beneficially owned directly by Ancora Merlin, and 137,453 shares of Common Stock held in the Ancora Alternatives SMAs. As the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Ancora Holdings, Mr. DiSanto may be deemed to beneficially own the 121,589 shares of Common Stock beneficially owned directly by Ancora Catalyst Institutional, 12,831 shares of Common Stock owned directly by Ancora Catalyst, 62,384 shares of Common Stock beneficially owned directly by Ancora Bellator, 123,075 shares of Common Stock beneficially owned directly by Ancora Merlin Institutional, 11,165 shares of Common Stock beneficially owned directly by Ancora Merlin, and 137,453 shares of Common Stock held in the Ancora Alternatives SMAs. As of the date hereof, Messrs. Boychuk, Fisher, Kestenbaum, Newport, Thomas, and Urban, Dr. Hayes and Ms. Simms do not beneficially own any shares of Common Stock.
___________________________ 1 The New York Times article entitled, "Trump's Love for Tariffs Began in Japan's '80s Boom," dated May 15, 2019. Link. 2 Statement from President Trump, dated December 3, 2024. Link. 3 Letter from Senator Josh Hawley and then-Senators Vance and Rubio to then-Secretary of the Treasury Yellen, dated December 19, 2023. Link. 4 The Japan Times article entitled, "Nippon Steel's case against Biden probably unwinnable, attorneys argue," dated January 15, 2025. Link. 5 Law360 article entitled, "Analysis: US Steel And Nippon's Lawsuit Seen As 'Hail Mary' Attempt," dated January 9, 2025. Link. 6 Law360 article entitled, "Expert Analysis: Nippon, US Steel Face Long Odds On Merger Challenge," dated January 15, 2025. Link. 7 Statement from Mr. Burritt, dated January 3, 2025. Link. 8 Statement from Mr. Burritt, dated January 3, 2025. Link. 9 U.S. Steel-Nippon Transaction Call, December 18, 2023. 10 U.S. Steel-Nippon Transaction Call, December 18, 2023. 11 Company press release, dated February 1, 2024. 12 Company press release, dated September 19, 2024. 13 Company press release, dated December 19, 2024. 14 Represents purchase price net of Stelco cash on hand at the transaction close.
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Longacre Square Partners LLC Charlotte Kiaie / Ashley Areopagita, 646-386-0091 ckiaie@longacresquare.com / aareopagita@longacresquare.com
Saratoga Proxy Consulting LLC John Ferguson / Joseph Mills, 212-257-1311 info@saratogaproxy.com